Russian Infantry - New Doctrine for Drones and Robots

The Russian Federation has adopted an innovative infantry doctrine, which prioritizes the use of drones and robotic systems, responding to the growing difficulties in recruiting and training troops. The analysis, conducted by the DeepState OSINT project in collaboration with the Telegram channel “Mannerheims son”, indicates a strategic shift aimed at replacing human mass with automation on the field.

Robo-infantry, Reduced and Independent Teams, and Drone Support Fire

A cornerstone of the new doctrine is the deployment of unmanned ground systems and FPV drones. These devices, often used in offensive roles, allow observation and striking of targets with reduced risk to personnel. In the past, in 2024, Russia resorted to raids with light weapons and improvised solutions; today, the aim is to leave the task to “machines”.

Farewell to compact columns of 30–60 men: now the choice is for groups of 2–4 soldiers, dispersed and autonomous. The increase in the number of these small units allows for simultaneous and unpredictable operations, facilitated by the technological coverage of drones.

Accompanying/support weapons are losing ground. The main support comes from drones, which act as cover fire, reducing the need for hand-to-hand combat and close encounters.

Forms of maneuver are evolving: flanking attacks are favored, bypassing enemy defensive lines and aiming for infiltrations in the rear. The goal is to hit command centers or mortar positions, as observed in the Zolotyi Kolodyaz area.

The Broader Strategic Picture

The adoption of advanced FPV drones, loitering munitions, and automated ground vehicles indicates a desire to compensate for the loss of personnel, integrating robotic capabilities to maintain pressure on Ukraine.

Furthermore, Russia has established a dedicated branch: the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces, aimed at centralizing and developing these technologies. Founded in 2025, this structure organizes specialized units, already employed in operational components, with ambitious recruitment plans up to 210,000 units by 2030.

An additional contribution to the analysis is provided by Ruslan Pukhov, who suggests that the post-infantry-weapons era has begun: FPV drones, supported by ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems and electronic countermeasures, are progressively replacing machine guns and mortars. We are witnessing the development of dispersed drone operator teams, which could render traditional fire visibility obsolete. However, Western observers highlight limitations such as vulnerability to jamming and adverse weather conditions.

Implications for the Ukrainian Front and Future of the Conflict

Ukraine, for its part, continues to rely on layered defenses, electronic warfare, and technical countermeasures (its own drones, anti-drone nets). But the increasing Russian automation changes the pace and face of battles: increasingly fluid fronts, rapid attacks, and difficulties in detecting and neutralizing advanced drones.

This strategic evolution, therefore, not only reflects needs imposed by human shortages but marks a shift towards a type of warfare where mechanical intelligence heavily influences the way of fighting.