Three billion to Ukraine (so far). Why not get help from Kyiv against the drone threat.

ROME, December 28, 2025 — Italy has already supported Ukraine with weapons, vehicles, and military equipment worth a total “of over 3 billion euros”, authorized by 11 interministerial decrees. This is stated by General Luciano Portolano, Chief of Defense Staff, in an interview with Sole 24 Ore picked up today by Repubblica.

Portolano links that figure to a broader view of security: “the boundaries of conflicts are blurred” and attacks can hit critical infrastructures, communication networks, and cyber systems even in peacetime. The “defense function,” he says, no longer concerns only operational theaters: it involves citizens, called to feel part of collective security. Hence the synthesis: being ready to react and support allies requires “constant commitment and preparation.”

Multidomain, technologies, and cyber: the center of modernization

The Defense orientation, continues Portolano, is “multidomain” and aims to fill technological asymmetries with targeted investments. The “most significant” item indicated by the Chief of Defense Staff is 5.44 billion for maintaining the operational conditions of the Armed Forces — “keystone” of the sustainability of the military instrument — with the goal of rebalancing organic endowments “particularly… in cybersecurity.” The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, he concludes, show the need for sustainability of conventional response, availability of armaments, readiness, and technological evolution.

Not one-way aid: why Italy could “get help” from Ukraine on drones

Within this framework, there is a point that reverses the perspective: not only what Italy sends to Kyiv, but what Europe — and Rome — can import from Ukrainian experience. In recent months, Volodymyr Zelensky has insisted on the idea that the know-how developed by Ukraine in defense against UAVs and missiles is now the most advanced in Europe and should be shared.

A passage particularly struck the Italian public opinion: in a post on X, Zelensky warned that, after alleged incursions and threats related to drones, “Italy could be next”, arguing that keeping air defense systems “at home” is not enough if the threat is transnational.

A few days later, in a speech at the Warsaw Security Forum, Zelensky proposed a “common air shield” with allies: Ukraine, he said, can counter Russian drones and missiles and, by acting together in the region, sufficient capabilities can be achieved also thanks to production and cooperation. Reuters also reports that Kyiv has already discussed training and anti-drone cooperation with area partners.

The concept has even become operational: according to Associated Press, Zelensky announced the start of a mission in Denmark to “spread Ukrainian experience” in drone defense, linking it to the European project of a sort of “drone wall” (network of detection, tracking, and interception) along the most exposed borders. Euronews, recounting the same thread, highlights how Kyiv proposes to partners to build a common shield “drawing on field experience” and describes the cooperation as a model extendable to other European countries.

Translated into Italian terms: if the war in Ukraine has accelerated the technological race on drones (attack, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and anti-drone), then the partnership can become bidirectional. Italy supports Kyiv with means and materials; Kyiv can contribute with tactics, procedures, training, and “lessons learned” on what really works when airspace is contested and saturated by UAVs.

The political context: the decree to extend shipments into 2026

On the domestic front, Portolano's words come on the eve of the Council of Ministers called to pass the new measure to extend the authorization for the transfer of materials to Kyiv. Repubblica reports an agreement reached within the majority after mediation with the Lega, with the indication of priority to defense aid.

In recent days, ANSA described the Lega's pressure for the text to also emphasize civil, health, and energy support, as well as a more “defensive” approach. And according to a reconstruction by Fatto Quotidiano, the decree would include a formulation that also prioritizes “logistical, health, civilian use” supports and protection from “aerial, missile, drone, and cyber” attacks, within the extension framework until December 31, 2026.

The underlying point

Portolano's message (“multidomain,” readiness, cyber, sustainability) and Zelensky's message (anti-drone, common shields, training) fit into the same scenario: the contemporary threat is mobile, hybrid, and often “low signature,” requiring technical capabilities that evolve faster than doctrines. In this sense, helping Ukraine and learning from Ukraine are not two contradictory lines: they can become two sides of the same European security strategy.