Madness: Why Crosetto is Right About the British Wall in the GCAP

ROME — Calling it “secrecy” is already an understatement. If indeed, as Guido Crosetto claims, the United Kingdom continues to withhold key technology within the GCAP program, then we are not facing normal industrial prudence: we are facing a strategic mistake. And yes, “madness” is the right word.

Because a sixth-generation fighter is not an aircraft “to be assembled together” in watertight compartments, where everyone delivers their piece and goes home. It is a complex digital system, built on deep integration: software, sensor fusion, electronic warfare, data links, materials, propulsion, mission architectures. If one of the three legs of the table refuses to really show what's under the hood, the table won't stand. And the project risks becoming a sum of incompatible silos, not a single shared capability.

The logic: not sharing with allies means weakening oneself

Crosetto points out the most uncomfortable issue: holding onto decisive technologies while asking others to invest billions means turning partners into “clients” and not allies. But a true industrial alliance works the opposite way: sharing serves to build interdependence, thus deterrence and resilience. Reluctance does not protect the program: it makes it more fragile, slower, and more expensive.

And this is where the accusation becomes geopolitical. If the GCAP slows down, fragments, or gets bogged down in mutual suspicions, who benefits? The adversaries. Russia and China do not need allies to give up secrets: it's enough for them to quarrel, duplicating costs and delaying deployment. Crosetto is not being rhetorical: he is describing a classic dynamic, where the lack of internal trust becomes an external advantage multiplier.

The precedent: “barriers of selfishness” is not a slogan, it's a governance risk

This is not the first time the minister has sounded the alarm. After his statements to Reuters, returning to the topic with Defense News means one thing: according to Rome, the problem has not been resolved. And if it is not resolved now, it becomes structural.

In these programs, power is not just about who produces what, but who controls the standards and who owns the software keys. Keeping everything “in the safe” may seem like a national advantage in the short term; in the medium term, it is the quickest way to create frictions, suspicions, and — inevitably — demands for countermeasures: internal duplications, cross-protectionism, alternative sub-projects. The result? Less efficiency, less interoperability, more costs.

The Italian choice: setting an example with Leonardo

The most concrete (and politically challenging) part of Crosetto's reasoning is this: “we start”. Saying that he has ordered Leonardo to share technology is a move that overturns the table: Italy exposes itself first, puts real assets on the table, and tries to force others to do the same.

It is also an internal message: if spending increases, the country must see a return in terms of technological autonomy and industrial capacity, not just an entry ticket. And here the discussion inevitably becomes political: when numbers rise, the public and Parliament ask “what do we get in return?”. If the answer is “not everything, because someone doesn't share”, the sustainability of the program weakens.

The illusion of “easy cooperation”

The GCAP is often portrayed as more fluid than other European projects. But fluidity is not a label: it is a daily practice of transparency and mutual access. A trilateral collaboration works only if everyone has equal technological dignity within the agreed perimeter. If one nation unilaterally decides that some areas are off-limits, cooperation becomes asymmetric. And asymmetry, over time, creates reactions.

This is why the idea of a common industrial structure (like Edgewing) must have real content and not just a brand: without clear rules on sharing and “black boxes”, the risk is to build a joint venture that coordinates contracts but does not truly integrate technology.

Rome and Tokyo: solid partnership, and for this reason clarity is needed

The fact that Giorgia Meloni and Sanae Takaichi have reiterated satisfaction with the progress is an important signal: Italy and Japan want the program to move forward. But precisely when the political framework is positive, it is the right time to resolve the hard knots — those that, if left to fester, explode later when it is too late and too costly to go back.

Conclusion: sharing is not charity, it is deterrence

Crosetto's thesis, read without prejudice, is pragmatic: in 2026, air superiority is not only bought with hardware, but with the mastery of the digital architecture. If the United Kingdom truly wants a strong, credible GCAP in a timely manner, it must treat Italy and Japan as equals even in the technological heart of the project.

Not sharing with allies today is not prudence: it is a gift to adversaries. And that is exactly why Crosetto speaks of “madness”.