Defense, clash in the majority: the real problem is Strategic Culture while the external threat is already knocking at the door

The debate on military spending within the majority is not just another tug-of-war between parties. It is, first and foremost, a symptom of a deeper fragility: many parliamentarians and parts of Italian politics do not have a true culture of Defense, meaning they do not think in terms of deterrence, national interests, security chains, influence, and credibility.

The result is a discussion crushed on two words — “costs” and “coverage” — as if Defense were a luxury. In reality, in an unstable international context, Defense is a system infrastructure: if it holds, it protects trade, energy, supply chains, investments; if it falters, the risks trickle down to families and businesses.

The split: Palazzo Chigi and MEF aim for graduality

Within this framework, the political clash ignites over the path to increase spending: the MEF considers a gradual increase and European instruments; part of the majority argues that Italy must regain credibility and capability; the Lega, however, sets boundaries, fears the impact on the accounts, and pushes to focus on internal security, trying to avoid the idea of “rearmament” as a banner.

So far, normal dialectics. But the point is why it becomes explosive: because there is a lack of a shared basis on what “national security” means today.

Everything is connected: external security, influence, economy, work

Here lies the issue that often does not enter talks or parliamentary corridors: if Italy is not credible on Defense, it is not credible even at the tables that matter. And if you don't count, you suffer.

• If you don't weigh in alliances, you have less voice when negotiating dossiers that directly affect the economy (energy, trade routes, Mediterranean stability, industrial rules, investments).
• If you don't demonstrate reliability, you attract less trust: and trust also means the ability to “magnetize” opportunities — contracts, technological projects, industrial cooperations — that then become work and development.
• If your stance is uncertain, other partners see you as the weak link: they listen to you less, involve you less, respect you less.

In this sense, Defense is not separate from well-being: it is the condition that makes it possible to protect and build well-being.

Migrants and instability: without an external shield, pressure increases

There is also another connection that Italian politics often treats as taboo: migratory pressure is also a product of external instability.
If the wider Mediterranean ignites and Italy cannot truly contribute to stability, deterrence, and crisis management (with military, diplomatic, and intelligence tools), the cost falls “at home”: more pressure on borders, more trafficking, more geopolitical blackmail, more emergencies.

It is not militarism: it is realism. A State that does not project capabilities, ends up importing problems.

The risk of “Little Italy”: provincial in tone, peripheral in fact

The paradox is that, while the world becomes tougher, in Italy there is a risk of returning to the old stance: the provincial “Little Italy” that tries to get by with statements and small adjustments, without a strategic vision.

And yet today the question is simple: do we want a country that matters — and therefore protects interests and citizens — or a country that floats and suffers? Because what changes is not just the spending: it is Italy's international status.

Conclusion: the real mediation is not between parties, but between past and present

The majority can also find a numerical compromise. But the real challenge is cultural: understanding that the external threat is not an abstract concept and that security, economy, and credibility are a single circuit.
Without an external shield, influence is reduced; without influence, opportunities and stability decrease; without stability, social costs and internal tensions increase.