America towards the Pacific, Europe tested: USA National Defense Strategy

Below is an analysis of the content of the PDF “2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS)” and the main impacts on Italy and Europe, with a conclusion on the prospects (interpretation and possible reactions) of Russia and China.

The NDS sets a very clear hierarchy of priorities:

1. Defense of the USA territory and the Western Hemisphere (borders, anti-narco-terrorism, “key terrain” like Panama/Greenland, “Golden Dome” air-missile defense, cyber, nuclear deterrence).
2. China as the “main challenge”: “by denial” deterrence in the Indo-Pacific along the First Island Chain, with more military communication channels for stability and de-escalation, but postures and capabilities aimed at making any aggression fail.
3. Burden-sharing: allies must assume primary responsibility in theaters “less severe for the USA but more severe for them”, with USA support “critical but more limited”.
4. Strengthening the USA defense industrial base (DIB), but also “leveraging allied and partner production” and industrial cooperation as a lever to accelerate rearmament and readiness of allies.

This architecture leads to a central message for Europe: the USA remains in NATO, but prioritizes the Indo-Pacific and homeland, and asks Europe to take charge of the continent's conventional defense.

Impacts on Europe (NATO and EU)

A. Political and financial pressure: “new standard” of spending

The NDS calls for a commitment to a total target of 5% of GDP (3.5% “core military” + 1.5% “security-related”). Even without delving into feasibility, the effect is clear: the European discussion shifts from ‘how much to increase’ to ‘how quickly and with what capabilities’.

EU/NATO implication: risk of intra-European frictions (countries with different fiscal margins) but also acceleration of:

• readiness plans, munitions, air/missile defense, and resilience (cyber, critical infrastructures);
• standardization and procurement with more emphasis on “capabilities that matter now”.

B. More European responsibility on Russia and Ukraine

The document defines Russia as a “persistent but manageable threat” for eastern NATO members and argues that Europe “dwarfs” Russia in economic capacity and latent military potential (chart: non-USA NATO GDP vs Russia).
Hence the consequence: support for Ukraine and conventional deterrence in Europe as a “European responsibility” with more limited USA support.

Implication: strong incentive towards a “Europeanisation” of the posture on the eastern front (forces, stocks, logistics, C2, air defense, ISR), to reduce the risk that a realignment of USA assets towards the Indo-Pacific leaves gaps.

C. Defense industry and trade barriers

The NDS insists on:

• USA industrial mobilization,
• but also transatlantic industrial cooperation and reduction of barriers in defense trade to maximize collective production and readiness.

EU implication: dual track:

• opportunities for co-production and transatlantic supply chains;
• tension with EU agendas of “industrial autonomy”/European preference: the text pushes for an “output-first” logic (munitions, systems, timelines) rather than “European origin”.

D. NATO: “rewarding” cooperation and conditionality

The strategy declares its intention to favor “model allies” (visible spending and contributions) with incentives like arms sales, industrial collaboration, and intelligence-sharing.
Implication: access to programs/technologies/agreements may become more “performance-based”, increasing intra-allied competition.

Specific impacts on Italy

1) Spending and capabilities: not just “more”, but “different”

If the political benchmark rises (5% total), Italy risks being under pressure on:

• readiness and stocks (munitions, spare parts, sustainability);
• air/missile defense and anti-drone (consistent with the NDS emphasis on defense against air/missile and UAS attacks).

Practical effect: even without immediately reaching that level, it will be important to demonstrate a “credible trajectory” and measurable contributions (ready, deployable forces, munitions, C2).

2) Role in Europe: “focus on Europe” and posture on the eastern flank

The NDS explicitly tells Europeans that resources and energies “are best focused on Europe”.
For Italy, this implies:

• more demand for contributions to deterrence/defense missions in Europe (particularly east and northeast), in addition to the traditional priorities of the southern flank.

3) Industry: opportunities (and constraints) for the Italian industrial base

Given the emphasis on “supercharge DIB” and “leveraging allied production”, Italy can:

• enter co-production programs, maintenance, supply chain, and munitions to shorten timelines and increase volumes;
  but must manage:
• supply chain security requirements and possible USA “preferences” for re-shoring (the NDS is explicitly re-industrializing).

4) Political-diplomatic plan: balance between NATO and EU “strategic autonomy”

The NDS pushes towards a more “transactional” NATO (accountability and burden-sharing).
For Italy, which often aims for mediation and cohesion, the impact is:

• greater need to align narrative + results (spending, readiness, contributions) to preserve influence and access to sensitive cooperations.

Russia's perspective: how it might interpret the NDS and what it might try to do

The NDS argues that Moscow cannot aim for European hegemony and that Europe has superior resources; therefore, the USA can calibrate its posture in Europe to prioritize homeland and China.

How Russia might react (plausible interpretation):

• Testing European cohesion: if responsibility shifts to Europe, Moscow might look for signs of political/budget hesitation, using informational pressure, cyber, and “gray zone” (the document explicitly cites Russian capabilities including cyber/space/undersea and nuclear).
• Betting on timing: Europe can “dwarf” Russia in potential, but converting this into ready military capabilities takes time; Russia might aim for windows of opportunity before European investments mature.
• Emphasizing nuclear as leverage: the NDS highlights the modernization of Russia's largest nuclear arsenal; this suggests that nuclear deterrence/coercion remains a central vector for Moscow.

China's perspective: how it might interpret the NDS and what it might try to do

China is described as a growing power and a priority target; the NDS talks about:

• wider communications with the PLA for stability and de-escalation,
• but above all building a “strong denial defense” along the First Island Chain to prevent regional domination.

How China might react (plausible interpretation):

• Accelerating A2/AD countermeasures and saturation capabilities (missiles, sensors, EW, cyber) to erode the effectiveness of a “by denial” deterrence. The NDS itself emphasizes the scale/quality of the Chinese buildup.
• Diplomacy to divide allies: the USA strategy wants to “urge and enable key regional allies” to do more; Beijing might aim to dissuade them through economic pressures and anti-containment narratives.
• Courtship of Europe: if Europe is pushed to “focus on Europe” and the USA concentrates on the Indo-Pacific, Beijing might seek more economic-political space in the European continent (not because the NDS favors it, but because the priority setup might create negotiation margins).

The NDS builds a paradigm: USA = homeland + China, while Europe = primary responsibility on Russia/Ukraine, with a NATO more conditioned to results (spending/capabilities). For Italy, this means pressure on spending and readiness, greater demand for contributions in Europe, and an industrial opportunity window within supply chains and co-productions, but within a more competitive and “performance-based” framework.